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(De-)Mobilising the Marginalised : A
Comparison of the Argentine Piqueteros
and Ecuador’s Indigenous Movement*
JONAS WOLFF
Abstract. In recent years, socio-political crises have challenged democracy across
South America. Social movements that succeeded in mobilising marginalised sectors
are at the forefront of this turbulence, Ecuador’s indigenous movement and the
organisations of unemployed workers in Argentina being paradigmatic cases. Recent
developments point to an intrinsic weakness of both indigenous and unemployed
movements, in that democratic regimes have proved highly successful at ‘ taming ’
them. By comparing the two movements, in terms of their internal dynamics and
interactions with the political system, this article argues that common characteristics
that were crucial for successful mobilisation in the first place, at the same time, help
explain their vulnerability to division and clientelist integration.
Keywords : Argentina, Ecuador, social movements, democracy, political crises, social
protest, indigenous movements, unemployed movements, piqueteros, clientelism
Introduction
South America’s ‘peaceful coexistence with intolerable conditions ’1 is com-
ing under increasing pressure. In recent years, social protests and political
crises have challenged democratic regimes across the region. ‘Popular im-
peachment ’, i.e. the ousting of elected presidents via mass protests, is now an
established pattern of political replacement. Social movements are at the
forefront of this turbulence, and are regarded as promoters of ‘ real ’ demo-
cratisation or, alternatively, as threats to democratic governability. Argentina
and Ecuador are paradigmatic cases in this respect. Here, democratic regimes
were shaken by economic crises that escalated into serious socio-political
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1 Moisés Naı́m, ‘From Normalcy to Lunacy ’, Foreign Policy, no. 141 (2004), p. 104.
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crises. Both countries harbour important social movements : the indigenous
movement in Ecuador and the movement of unemployed workers (piqueteros)
in Argentina. The purpose of this article is to shed light on the seemingly
contradictory observation that these movements of marginalised and thus
hard-to-mobilise sectors have become crucial political actors challenging the
existing polities while they, for their part, have proven highly successful in
‘ taming’ them without really giving in to their demands.
There is a wealth of evidence in support of the first observation.2 But
precisely as we have learned to understand better how these new collective
actors emerge in a context that seems rather hostile to popular sector organ-
isations, the question arises as to how to explain the rapid weakening that
both the Argentine piqueteros and the Ecuadorian indigenous movement ex-
perienced. By the end of 2003 these social movements were generally re-
garded as ‘ in crisis ’ and they have yet to recover their former strength. The
present article asks whether there are commonalties between the two
movements that help explain the common result of weakening and crisis.
The central argument is somewhat counterintuitive : that the shared charac-
teristics of both movements that have been identified as enabling them to
succeed prove at the same time important factors accounting for the sur-
prising capacity of the democratic regime to absorb and re-integrate them. In
this sense, the analysis reveals a remarkable capacity on the part of the re-
spective political systems to react and adjust to contentious challengers
‘ from below’.
In the cases analysed, success in mobilising the marginalised and trans-
forming them into a serious challenge to the political system depended, inter
alia, on a specific form of politicisation that combined a stance of radical
rejection with a pragmatist orientation towards the local community and
concrete needs. Yet, this specific characteristic of both movements limited
2 On Latin America’s indigenous movements see Donna Lee Van Cott, From Movements to
Parties in Latin America. The Evolution of Ethnic Politics (Cambridge, 2005) ; Deborah J. Yashar,
Contesting Citizenship in Latin America. The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal
Challenge (Cambridge, 2005) ; and Nancy Grey Postero and Leon Zamosc (eds.), The Struggle
for Indigenous Rights in Latin America (Brighton, 2004). On Ecuador see Augusto Barrera,
Acción Colectiva y Crisis Polı́tica. El Movimiento Indı́gena Ecuatoriano en la Década de los Noventa
(Quito, 2001) ; Melina Selverston-Scher, Ethnopolitics in Ecuador. Indigenous Rights and the
Strengthening of Democracy (Coral Gables, 2001) ; and Jonas Wolff, Demokratisierung als Risiko
der Demokratie ? Die Krise der Politik in Bolivien und Ecuador und die Rolle der indigenen Bewegungen
(Frankfurt, 2004). On the Argentine piqueteros see Maristella Svampa and Sebastián Pereyra,
Entre la ruta y el barrio. La experiencia de las organizaciones piqueteras (Buenos Aires, 2004) ;
Gabriela Delamata, ‘The Organizations of Unemployed Workers in Greater Buenos
Aires ’, Working Paper of the Center for Latin American Studies (Berkeley, 2004) ; and
Edward Epstein, ‘The Piquetero Movement in Greater Buenos Aires : Political Protests by
the Unemployed Poor During the Crisis ’, in Edward Epstein and David Pion-Berlin (eds.),
Broken Promises ? The Argentine Crisis and Argentine Democracy (Lanham, 2006), pp. 95–115.
2 Jonas Wolff
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their possible role as protagonists of macro-political change ; in particular,
the two proved highly vulnerable to division, clientelist integration and co-
optation. This said, it is important to emphasise that the article does not
intend to criticise the respective movements for having failed to realise their
ambitious visions of social change. Such a judgement would demand an
evaluation of the prospects of alternative movement strategies as well as the
possibilities and limits for radical change in the contemporary world order in
general and the specific state/society complexes of Argentina or Ecuador in
particular.
In addition, it has to be highlighted that in respects other than those
discussed here the Ecuadorian indigenous movement and the Argentine
piqueteros represent markedly different phenomena. The recent processes of
mobilisation and politicisation on the part of indigenous peoples in Ecuador
have to be seen in the context of centuries of explicit racist oppression.
Correspondingly, the dynamics of these indigenous movements are shaped
by the interaction between an explicitly ethnic-based identity – as
indı́genas – and a social identity – as excluded and poor popular sectors – that
transcends ethnicity. In contrast, the phenomenon of the movements of
unemployed workers in Argentina owes its existence to an important rupture
with the country’s ‘ traditional ’ social structure : the eruption of mass un-
employment and poverty since the 1980s. Here it is not the history of ex-
clusion, but the memory and experience of (former) inclusion in the context
of dramatic current deprivation that shapes the dynamics of mobilisation.
This article aims not at a comprehensive comparison of the two social
movements but at a narrower focus on the commonalities between indı́genas
and piqueteros. Precisely because origin and composition, identities and goals
are so different, common characteristics, dynamics and consequences are of
particular interest when it comes to understanding the status, crisis and
transformation of democracy in Latin America. If this strategy to look for
common patterns in remarkably different cases, with a view to explaining
comparable outcomes, generates a plausible argument, strengthening the
explanation developed would obviously require extending the comparison to
include ‘similar ’ cases that differ in outcome.3
The article starts by briefly tracing the political rise of both movements to
then identify the commonalities characterising these success stories. The
second part analyses the internal dynamics of the movements, their macro-
political repercussions and interactions ; here, the common characteristics are
used to explore their intrinsic weakness and, particularly, their vulnerability
to division and clientelist integration. While the first part draws mainly on a
systematic review of secondary sources, the second part benefits from 75
3 Bolivia could possibly be such a case as one anonymous reviewer suggested.
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interviews conducted with representatives from social movements, political
institutions and the scientific community in Argentina and Ecuador between
October 2004 and March 2005. In particular, representative samples of the
diverse spectra of unemployed and indigenous organisations were inter-
viewed to gain an understanding of their respective logics of action.4
Together with existing research on the topic, the data collected during this
field research provides the empirical basis for tracing processes within and
between the respective social movements as well as their interactions with
state and society in general.
The emergence of the movements : becoming new political actors
The next two sections will look at the particular histories of the indigenous
movement in Ecuador and the Argentine piqueteros. I subsequently turn to
consider the commonalities between the two.
The Ecuadorian indigenous movement
Processes of indigenous organisation took off in the 1970s and accelerated
during the 1980s, but only the 1990s saw ‘ the transformation of indigenous
movements in some Latin American countries from momentarily influential
outsiders to powerful and effective collective political actors with a sustained
presence in regional and national politics ’.5 Indı́genas in Ecuador entered the
national scene with a first levantamiento (uprising) in 1990. In the 1990s, the
national confederation Confederación de Nacionalidades Indı́genas del Ecuador
(CONAIE) became the region’s strongest indigenous organisation. CONAIE
brought together confederations from the three regions (Amazonian low-
land, Andean highland and coast) and could thus establish itself as the prime
representative of the 30 to 40 per cent indigenous population.
Starting with the 1990 levantamiento, the indigenous movement experienced
an impressive rise in political power. In 1996, just after having been formed,
the mainly indigenous party Pachakutik entered Congress as the fourth largest
force. Pachakutik swiftly became one of the major parties at the national level,
and indigenous mayors came to govern numerous municipalities in the
highlands and lowlands. Following important uprisings in the early 1990s,
CONAIE played an important role in 1997 in the protests against President
4 Based on these semi-structured interviews, a qualitative content analysis was conducted
that resulted in the construction of cognitive maps for the different organisations. Due to
the restricted space available, however, this article can present only the general results of
this in-depth analysis.
5 Donna Lee Van Cott, ‘Broadening Democracy : Latin America’s Indigenous Peoples’
Movements ’, Current History, vol. 103, no. 670 (2004), p. 80. On the following, see the
sources in note 2.
4 Jonas Wolff
the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X0600201X
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Hessische Stiftung Friedens - und Konfliktforschun, on 02 Sep 2021 at 07:01:07, subject to
Bucaram who was then deposed by Congress. Indigenous participation in
the 1997 Constituent Assembly was decisive for the granting of collective
rights to the indigenous peoples in the new constitution. In 1998, the Council
for the Development of the Nationalities and Peoples of Ecuador
(CODENPE) was created, a para-state development agency entity managed
mainly by CONAIE. In the wake of the military/indigenous rebellion against
President Mahuad in January 2000 the then President of CONAIE, Antonio
Vargas, participated in the ‘Triumvirate of National Salvation’ that took
power for a few hours. And in the presidential elections of 2002 Lucio
Gutiérrez – another member of the ‘ triumvirate ’ and the candidate sup-
ported by the indigenous movement – won election, and indigenous rep-
resentatives for the first time occupied important ministries (Foreign Affairs
and Agriculture).
Five general trends characterise these processes of indigenous mobilis-
ation. First, the socially constructed indigenous identity became the prime
reference driving organisation and collective action. This ethnicity-based
self-identification was superimposed on (and partially displaced) the pri-
marily class-based pattern of social mobilisation and political representation
that characterised earlier attempts at organising the indigenous sectors.
Second, starting from the concrete demands of specific indigenous com-
munities (regarding for example, territorial claims and conflicts with oil
extracting companies), indigenous claims broadened in scope and depth,
incorporating the constitutional recognition of indigenous rights, the re-
definition of the political collectivity as a pluri-national and multiethnic state,
and the reorientation of economic, social and development policies. Third,
an organisational expansion accompanied this progressive politicisation as
organisations of single indigenous communities and peoples formed re-
gional, national and transnational confederations. Fourth, these processes led
the indigenous movement to enter the sphere of formal democratic politics.
At the same time, the formation of Pachakutik and its electoral successes
point to a fifth trend: the establishment of diverse contacts and alliances with
urban social movements and other non-indigenous progressive political
forces. As the new and strong CONAIE and a diverse spectrum of indi-
vidually weak and fragmented non-indigenous organisations and movements
jointly repudiated an exclusionary and corrupt economic and political sys-
tem – condensed to the common target of ‘neo-liberalism’ – the indigenous
movement was able to ‘combine a discourse of multiculturalism and ethnic
tolerance with opposition to neoliberal economic reforms’ to form and ‘ lead
anti-neoliberal coalitions ’.6 The rebellion-turned-coup against President
Mahuad in 2000 and the triumphant coalition supporting the candidacy of
6 Ibid., p. 83.
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Gutiérrez in 2002 symbolise these capacities of the Ecuadorian indigenous
movement, even if their attempts to seize power would also reveal their
limitations.7
The Argentine piquetero movement
As processes of socio-economic deprivation do not automatically translate
into processes of contentious mobilisation, it took a specific confluence of
factors to enable what Pierre Bourdieu called a social miracle : the emergence
of a movement of the unemployed. This specificity is particularly obvious as
regards the very beginnings of what was to become the Argentine piquetero
(picket) movement. The ‘first piquete ’ in Cutral-Co and Plaza Huincul in
1996, and the roadblocks and upheavals in General Mosconi and Tartagal
since 1997 have been identified as the two ‘ ‘‘model ’’ experiences ’8 that
shaped later mobilisation processes. In these oil towns dependent on the
state petroleum company Yacimientos Petrolı́feros Fiscales (YPF), the dis-
articulation of the past developmental model affected virtually entire local
communities : the privatisation of YPF meant not only the dramatic (direct
and indirect) loss of jobs, but also the dismantling of an entire parallel wel-
fare state.9
The protests that erupted in the country’s interior in the late 1990s – and
intensified in response to political efforts to repress them – demonstrated
that collective resistance was possible. In Cutral-Co/Plaza Huincul as in
General Mosconi/Tartagal, massive roadblocks (piquetes) forced state re-
presentatives to negotiate with the unemployed and to concede their de-
mands. Given a situation of mass un- and underemployment, rising poverty,
and indigence, this experience quickly spread across Argentina and, es-
pecially, into the de-industrialised suburbs around Buenos Aires. In 1997
there were already 170 piquetes across the country, escalating year on year to
252 (1999), 514 (2000), 1,383 (2001) and 2,336 (2002) roadblocks.10
7 In January 2000, the high command of the armed forces offered only tactical support to the
rebellious military/indigenous alliance and, under US pressure, quickly dissolved the ‘ tri-
umvirate ’ to install the former Vice-President as Mahuad’s successor. As regards Gutiérrez’
presidency, the new president quickly changed alliances and policies in favour of an openly
pro-market, pro-establishment and pro-US stance, and, in this way, lost the support of
almost all his former indigenous and non-indigenous allies. On the former see Catherine
E. Walsh, ‘The Ecuadorian Political Irruption. Uprisings, Coups, Rebellions, and Democ-
racy ’, Nepantla, vol. 2, no. 1 (2001), pp. 173–204 ; on the latter see Augusto Barrera et al.,
Entre la utopı́a y el desencanto. Pachakutik en el gobierno de Gutiérrez (Quito, 2004).
8 Svampa and Pereyra, Entre la ruta, p. 103.
9 See Javier Auyero, ‘The Moral Politics of Argentine Crowds ’, Mobilization, vol. 9, no. 3
(2004), pp. 311–26; Svampa and Pereyra, Entre la ruta, pp. 103–51.
10 Nueva Mayorı́a, ‘El 2005 está mostrando el mayor nivel mensual de cortes de rutas y vı́as
públicas desde 2003 ’, 17 August 2005, http://www.nuevamayoria.com.
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According to Svampa and Pereyra, the emergence of the piqueteros as a
strong – if by no means unitary – political actor was enabled by the ‘con-
vergence of two factors : the adoption of roadblocks as the generalised
technique of struggle, on the one hand; the rapid institutionalisation of a
response by the state via the planes sociales, on the other ’.11 The latter refers to
social subsidies that the federal and provincial governments have granted,
since President Menem’s second term, to unemployed households ; in return,
the recipients were generally obliged to participate in municipal work or local
development projects. In this way, the unemployed protests right from the
start had a concrete, feasible and unifying objective : the perpetuation of
existing planes and the granting of new ones. In 1999, the new ALIANZA
government headed by Fernando de la Rúa allowed the piquetero organisa-
tions to present their own local development projects and administer the
social subsidies and the corresponding projects themselves. This directly con-
tributed to the piquetero organisations’ development ‘on the ground’ by
prompting the improvement of their organisational structures as well as by
strengthening their ties to the individual member and to the respective local
community.12 As is typical for ‘poor people’s movements ’, the unemployed
had, thus, to mobilise first to seize the resources that are normally deemed
necessary for contentious mobilisation to occur.13 The latter are not only
material in nature : in conjunction, the collective experience of massive (and
successful) protests and the participatory solidarity work in the respective
local settings helped transform the negatively defined self-identification as
‘ the unemployed’ into a positive identity : the piquetero.
The increase in organisation and roadblocks in 2000 and 2001 – further
impelled by the escalating economic crisis – went hand in hand with efforts
to co-ordinate and organise the different piquetero groups. Two national as-
semblies in 2001 failed as attempts to unite the entire spectrum of organis-
ations and movements. However, while the assemblies brought to the fore
the deep political and strategic differences dividing the movement they never-
theless led to the emergence of co-ordinating bodies, co-operative relations
and concerted protest activities, if primarily within the respective political
components.14 Thus they furthered the image of the piqueteros as the new
11 Svampa and Pereyra, Entre la ruta, p. 55.
12 The importance of these planes for the emergence and development of the piquetero
movement is emphasised in virtually all analyses of the phenomenon and has been con-
firmed in interviews with representatives from a variety of piquetero organisations. See
Svampa and Pereyra, Entre la ruta, pp. 88–102; Delamata, ‘The Organizations ’, pp. 9–11.
13 Roland Roth, ‘Die Rückkehr des Sozialen. Neue soziale Bewegungen, poor people’s
movements und der Kampf um soziale Bürgerrechte ’, Forschungsjournal Neue Soziale
Bewegungen, vol. 10, no. 2 (1997), pp. 38–50.
14 It is difficult to categorise the Argentine piquetero movement. As an approximation it is
possible to differentiate between the ‘softer ’, reformist organisations that are more
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contentious political actor on the national scene. In the end, the mass pro-
tests of December 2001 that led to the ousting of President De la Rúa were
basically a spontaneous ‘ social explosion’ in response to desperate political
attempts to save the Argentine currency board in which organised societal
forces played only minor roles.15 Yet the generalising social protests led
particularly by the piqueteros certainly prepared the ground for the latter
events. With the experience of December 2001 behind it, and the weak
transition government headed by Eduardo Duhalde confronting it, the
piquetero movement only gained in momentum.
The virtual collapse of the Argentine economy in 2002 greatly enhanced
the piqueteros’ social base. Ideologically, the slogan ‘Que se vayan todos ’ (‘Out
with them all ! ’) that had shaped the protests of December 2001 and trans-
lated into different types of ongoing protest activities in 2002 meant that the
piqueteros ’ criticism of the exclusionary nature of both the political regime and
the economic model had widespread appeal. Politically, the government had
to make important concessions to the organisations of the unemployed:
Duhalde – and his successor Kirchner – had to accept them as official in-
terlocutors representing important sectors of society. Reacting to the open
socio-political crisis, Duhalde massively extended the social emergency
plans, which – via the new Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar – eventually included
some two million households.16 Additionally, the piquetero organisations were
able to win the granting of such planes (and food aid among other benefits)
via roadblocks, and in nearly 10 per cent of cases they obtained the right to
manage the corresponding funds and projects themselves. When in June
2002 the police killed two piqueteros, President Duhalde felt obliged to bring
forward the presidential elections in order to prevent social protest from
oriented towards negotiation, co-operation and dialogue with the state, and the more
‘ radical ’ groups that take a much more confrontational stance towards the state and em-
phasise the necessity of revolutionary change. The most important example of the first
current is the Federación Tierra y Vivienda (FTV), one of the biggest nation-wide piquetero
organisations which forms part of the dissident labour confederation Central de los
Trabajadores Argentinos (CTA); it is characterised by a trade-unionist and left-Peronist
orientation, and since the election of President Kirchner in May 2003 openly supports the
government. The latter group – which in December 2001 formed the National Piquetero
Block – combines organisations led by small parties of the traditional radical left like the
Polo Obrero and various ‘autonomous ’ movements of unemployed workers (smaller
groups that can be found mainly in Great Buenos Aires). Another important organisation is
the Corriente Clasista y Combativa (CCC) – a Maoist trade union with a separate and very
strong piquetero wing that combines radical rhetoric with a rather pragmatic approach. For
an overview see Svampa and Pereyra, Entre la ruta, pp. 239–42.
15 See Jonas Wolff, ‘Ambivalent consequences of social exclusion for real-existing democracy
in Latin America : the example of the Argentine crisis ’, Journal of International Relations and
Development, vol. 8, no. 1 (2005), pp. 58–87.
16 See Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales, Plan Jefes y Jefas. ¿Derecho social o beneficio sin
derechos ? (Buenos Aires, 2003).
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escalating to an uncontrollable degree. While the organisations of the
unemployed were certainly but one actor among others that drove the
generalised social protests characterising the serious crises of Argentine
democracy in 2001/2002, they proved the only new and durable type of
contentious collective action with a persistent impact on the national political
scene.17
The movements’ commonalities
At the turn of the century, in Argentina and Ecuador new socio-political
actors that were able to mobilise and represent marginalised sectors chal-
lenged the political regimes that had evolved from the transition to democ-
racy in the respective countries. In contrast to the relatively recent
phenomenon the piqueteros represented, the indigenous movement had
evolved over decades, building around a powerful (ethnic) cleavage a strong
socio-political force, gaining representation and participation in political in-
stitutions, and forcing the state to redefine its very identity via constitutional
reforms.18 Yet, when it comes to explaining the emergence and strength of
both new socio-political actors, some common characteristics are indeed cen-
tral. These joint features represent, in part, characteristics that are typical for
social movements (in democratic settings) in general and in the contempor-
ary era of neo-liberal globalisation in particular ;19 more specifically, these
commonalities can be traced back, inter alia, to characteristics both countries
share as South American ‘young democracies ’ undergoing a crisis-driven
transformation of the economy, the state and state-society relations. This
article, however, does not seek to explain these commonalities, but to identify
them in order to explore their consequences (technically speaking, they are
treated as independent, not as dependent, variables).
Four specific features proved important for the successful, durable and
politically challenging contentious mobilisation of marginalised sectors in
both instances : a specific form of politicisation, namely a ‘collective action
frame’20 that combined a ‘negative ’ macro-political focus with a ‘positive ’
pragmatist stance (as to concrete micro-political claims) ; a specific territoriality,
17 In contrast, for example, the movement of neighbourhood assemblies that literally
exploded with the events of December 2001 quickly lost momentum.
18 See for example Robert Andolina, ‘The Sovereign and its Shadow: Constituent Assembly
and Indigenous Movement in Ecuador ’, Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 35, no. 4
(2003), pp. 721–50.
19 See for example Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention
(Cambridge, 2001) ; Sidney Tarrow, Power in movement : Social movements and Contentious Politics
(New York, 1999) ; Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, ‘Framing Processes and Social
Movements : An Overview and Assessment ’, Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 26 (2000),
pp. 611–39. 20 Benford and Snow 2000, ‘Framing Processes ’.
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i.e. a foundation and embeddedness in the local sphere or community ; an
organisational strategy that responded to the crisis of representation of both the
institutions of formal democracy and the traditional representatives of the
popular sectors (trade unions and left parties) by relying to an important
extent on participatory and consensus-oriented mechanisms; and a repertoire
of contention centred on a specific technique of contentious collective ac-
tion – the roadblock – that proved highly consistent with the form of poli-
ticisation identified (see Table 1).
In the language of contentious collective action research,21 Latin
America’s double transformation – combining political democratisation with
a neo-liberally guided restructuring of the developmental model – led to a
highly ambivalent political opportunity structure. On the one hand, demo-
cratisation not only opened and guaranteed spaces and avenues for conten-
tious mobilisation but also entailed the promise and expectation of (not
merely formal) equality and comprehensive progress. The impressive devel-
opment of the Ecuadorian indigenous movement in the 1980s and 1990s is
directly connected to this enabling and activating context : democracy created
strong incentives for political parties and leaders to respond ‘ from above ’ to
claims representing important parts of society, unique opportunities to
organise and enter the political sphere ‘ from below’ (supplemented by lim-
ited possibilities for political repression), and the establishment of official
benchmarks on which to base contentious claims. At the same time, the
debt crisis and subsequent stabilisation and structural adjustment measures
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21 See McAdam et al., Dynamics of Contention, and Tarrow, Power in Movement.
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reinforced the impression that the democratic promise of inclusion remained
largely unfulfilled.22
A similar story applies to the Argentine movement of unemployed
workers, although in this case particular political opportunities constituted by
concrete democratic politics appear decisive for activating the seizing of the
general opportunities offered by democracy. The Menem presidencies
(1989–1999) and the subsequent ALIANZA government led by De la Rúa
(1999–2001) implemented broadly the same (economic and social) policies
while unemployment and poverty remained high and rose dramatically with
the Argentine crisis (2001/2002), and both were charged with corruption
while neither political parties nor parliament had any answers to the in-
tensifying ‘crisis of representation’. After four years of recession and de-
flation (1998–2001), broad parts of society were increasingly receptive to the
contentious claims the piqueteros brought forward. As suggested by the
framing approach to social movements,23 this public resonance – manifested
in opinion polls, media coverage and in passive tolerance or even active
support of protest activities – indeed proved crucial for the piqueteros’ politi-
cal rise. In much the same manner, the Ecuadorian indigenous movement
gained in importance during the 1990s when it was increasingly seen as not
‘only ’ promoting particular indigenous interests and values, but as re-
presenting a new force leading an anti-neo-liberal and anti-establishment
platform.24
On the other hand, both movements had to cope from the start with
systematic impediments towards mobilising marginalised sectors that are
usually fragmented, heterogeneous and ‘poor in many resources, not only
economic ’, making them ‘unlikely to organise autonomously and, especially,
to sustain collective actions appropriate for overcoming their condition’.25 In
this sense, economic crises and structural adjustment measures since the
early 1980s contributed to a social setting hostile to popular sector mobilis-
ation; the exhaustion of leftist ideologies and growing external constraints on
economic and social policies added to this.26 Even Ecuador’s indigenous
22 See Yashar, Contesting Citizenship, pp. 85–151.
23 Benford and Snow, ‘Framing Processes ’, pp. 619–22.
24 Otherwise, neither the electoral successes of Pachakutik in mestizo Ecuador nor the fact that
some 10,000 indı́genas supported by lower-rank military personnel could peacefully invade
Congress and Supreme Court in January 2000 can be explained. See José Antonio Lucero,
‘Crisis and Contention in Ecuador ’, Journal of Democracy, vol. 12, no. 2 (2001), pp. 59–73.
25 Guillermo O’Donnell, Counterpoints : Selected Essays on Authoritarianism and Democratization
(Notre Dame, IN, 1999), p. 207.
26 On the general consequences of Latin America’s double transformation for popular sector
organisations see Philip Oxhorn and Pamela Starr, eds., Markets and Democracy in Latin
America. Conflict or Convergence ? (Boulder, 1999) ; Marcus Kurtz, ‘The Dilemmas of
Democracy in the Open Economy. Lessons from Latin America ’, World Politics, vol. 56,
no. 1 (2004), pp. 262–302 ; and Wolff, ‘Ambivalent Consequences ’.
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movement – which due to the strong and unifying indı́gena identity was able
to largely coalesce around CONAIE – has always been highly fragmented
and heterogeneous. This refers not only to important regional splits
(especially between Andean highland and Amazonian lowland) and ethnic
divisions (between the different indigenous peoples), but – precisely because
of the self-definition as representing entire peoples – to socio-economic
heterogeneity as well (demanding the representation of independent mini-
fundistas, farm workers, self-employed informal sector workers, the formally
employed, petty merchants, small entrepreneurs and urban intellectuals).
Additionally, it faces competing indigenous confederations such as the
national federation of evangelical indigenous people, FEINE, or the more
trade unionist peasant organisation, FENOCIN.
As regards the piquetero movement, heterogeneity and fragmentation – in
spite of the common label ( piqueteros) – inhibited any attempts at more than
sporadic joint organisation and mobilisation processes. These divisions stem
not only from divergent political strategies, but also from a deeply hetero-
geneous and fragmented social base. This might appear surprising as the
movement is defined by a common socio-economic situation (unemploy-
ment) ; but due to the massive scale and diversity of the loss of formal
employment opportunities in Argentina, ‘as much as the casualisation of
labour multiplied the gaps between individuals, the experience of unem-
ployment aggregated in one and the same group social categories and tra-
jectories that are most different in terms of knowledge and skills,
professional status and life style ’.27
Formally functioning but publicly delegitimised democracy presented a
decisive opportunity structure to both movements. However, neither the
indı́genas nor the piqueteros took this opportunity to promote a ‘positive ’
agenda that could have served as a political platform for broader social al-
liances. Reflecting the above-mentioned general setting of socio-political
fragmentation, the common denominator on the macro-political level was
a largely ‘negative ’ agenda: the broadly shared rejection of the political
establishment and the socio-economic ‘model ’ in general, and specific poli-
ticians, parties or policies in particular. This ‘negative ’ – or ‘de-stituent ’ –
power has been emphasised with regard to the Argentine political crisis.28
As to the indigenous movements in Ecuador (and Bolivia), Van Cott con-
cludes that ‘ [w]hile sufficiently effective to oust two presidents and to block
neoliberal policies, their obstructive political power has exceeded their
27 Svampa and Pereyra, Entre la ruta, p. 155.
28 Ana Dinerstein, ‘ ¡Que se Vayan Todos! Popular Insurrection and the Asambleas Barriales
in Argentina ’, Bulletin of Latin American Research, vol. 22, no. 2 (2003), pp. 187–200;
Colectivo Situaciones, 19 y 20 : Apuntes para el nuevo protagonismo social (Buenos Aires, 2002).
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ability to offer a coherent alternative to prevailing economic and political
models ’.29
The political agendas of the two movements cannot be defined as merely
‘negative ’. The argument is that the macro-political claims constituting the
strength of these movements centred around a collective action frame of
‘global rejection’, i.e. around the general refusal of ‘ the (political or econ-
omic) system’ (exemplified in specific politicians and proposals) ; this radical
‘negative ’ focus then combined with a ‘positive ’ stance that referred in a
rather pragmatist way to concrete micro-political claims. Notwithstanding the
fact that the different piquetero organisations offer ‘positive ’ proposals re-
garding the macro-political change they prefer, their significance as political
actors is largely confined to a prohibitive (veto) power, on the one hand, and
to an enforcing power regarding their concrete (material) demands, on the
other.30 Ecuador’s CONAIE since the early 1990s has developed important
‘positive ’ proposals regarding the reform of the country’s political and
economic regime. Yet again, its strength – in terms of internal unity, external
resonance, and political impact – stemmed from CONAIE’s ‘political proj-
ect ’ with its focus on concrete claims regarding specifically indigenous rights,
interests and values, and the broadly shared ‘negative ’ rejection of specific
(neo-liberally guided) political and economic reforms and their protag-
onists.31
Thus ‘positive ’ claims in both cases centred on concrete grievances and
claims that – independent from any macro-political aspirations – were dee-
ply connected to the local settings from which the mobilisation processes
originated. This points directly to the second common feature : while the
ethnic or functional self-definition (as indı́genas or unemployed) was certainly
important for the emergence and growth of the respective movements, their
strength and sustainability was (and remains) also due to the fact that they
were founded and are embedded in discrete territorial settings, be it rural
indigenous communities, suburban squatter settlements (asentamientos) or
urban quarters (barrios). Historically, the politico-organisational development
of the Ecuadorian indigenous peoples emerged, on the one hand, from
29 Van Cott, ‘Broadening Democracy ’, p. 80.
30 The internal common denominator of the piquetero movement is represented by the (at the
same time particularising) demand for social subsidies as well as by the rejection of re-
pressive measures against the movement ; their external resonance is based mainly on their
general criticism of the politico-economic Argentine model of the 1990s.
31 See Van Cott, From Movements to Parties, pp. 106–13. This is made clear by the president of
CONAIE’s Amazonian branch CONFENIAE, Luis Vargas, when he emphasises – with a
view to the confederation’s internal divisions – that ‘CONAIE has to recapture its political
project. [_] Without any political bias, [we have to] defend the pluri-culturalism, the pluri-
nationality, the territorial rights, the ancestral rights of the indigenous peoples ’ (Personal
communication).
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territorial conflicts led by indigenous communities claiming their right to
ancestral soils and, on the other, from rural development projects, which
were regularly implemented through the indigenous communities.32
Consequently, the contemporary indigenous movement evolved mainly via
organisational bottom-up processes. The territorial organizaciones de base
(communities, co-operatives and associations) have remained the organis-
ational cornerstone of the movement(s), and ‘ local restructuring ’ has been
‘ the main focus of CONAIE’s political project ’.33 The communities’ specific
needs and claims continue to be of prime importance for the activities of
indigenous organisations as well as for their interaction with state and de-
velopment agencies. This is also due to the fact that the perceived attendance of
these needs and claims by different indigenous (and non-indigenous) organ-
isations is vital for their respective acceptance and support ‘on the ground’
and, thus, for their political legitimacy and their mobilisation capacities.34
Given the traditional prominence of the territory and the local community
for indigenous collectivities, the indigenous movement’s foundation and
embeddedness in the local sphere does not come as a surprise.35
Interestingly, however, the Argentine unemployed movement shares im-
portant facets of this specific spatiality. The emergence and development of
the piquetero phenomenon clearly reflects ‘ the logic of collective mobilisation
in a context of accelerated decomposition of salaried society ’.36 While the
unemployed movement certainly drew on the experiences of the (function-
ally defined) Argentine labour movement, the concrete mobilisation pro-
cesses emerged from the poor and marginalised (sub-) urban spaces – the
barrios and asentamientos. Given the crisis of the trade unions and the dis-
mantling of state-corporatist structures, the un-, under- and self-employed
new and old poor reacted to socio-economic deprivation with a ‘ retreat to
the barrio ’ : ‘ [o]n the basis of local solidarities [_], classical patterns of social
mobilisation evolved in the barrios : collective occupation of land to build
housing, self-administration of certain public services, organisation of
nurseries, soup kitchens and communal health centres, etc. ’.37 These local
networks served as starting points for the piqueteros’ mobilisation processes.38
32 Vı́ctor Bretón, Cooperación al desarrollo y demandas étnicas en los Andes ecuatorianos (Quito, 2001).
33 Walsh, ‘The Ecuadorian Political Irruption ’, p. 194.
34 See Bretón, Cooperación al desarrollo, p. 31. The communities’ needs and claims continue to
centre on territorial questions and local development projects (personal communications
with representatives of a broad range of indigenous organisations).
35 Yashar, Contesting Citizenship, pp. 87–130.
36 Denis Merklen, ‘Sobre la base territorial de la movilización popular y sobre sus huellas en la
acción ’, Lavboratorio, vol. 6, no. 16 (2004), p. 46. 37 Ibid., p. 49.
38 See Isabel Rauber, Piquetes y piqueteros en la Argentina de la crisis. Cerrar el paso abriendo caminos
(Quito, 2002), http://www.rebelion.org/docs/4859.pdf, pp. 5–6; Svampa and Pereyra,
Entre la ruta, pp. 55–72. ‘Before we became the piquetero movement, it was a territorial, a
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In addition, two fundamentally territorial phenomena shaped the emergence
and growth of the unemployed organisations : the joint experience of col-
lective protest in the piquete itself,39 and the expansion of solidarity/neigh-
bourhood work driven by the economic crisis and facilitated by the granting
of social subsidies.40
The diversity of the piquetero movement notwithstanding (see note 14),
almost all organisations of unemployed workers – even those that were
formed ‘ top down’ as macro-political projects by small radical parties or
activists – draw their mobilisational capacity ‘bottom up’ from grassroots
organisations that conduct self-help initiatives, operate embedded in the re-
spective local communities and focus on serving concrete needs.41 For ex-
ample, the emergence of the nation-wide Federación Tierra y Vivienda
(FTV) can be traced back to a small self-help co-operative in El Tambo, a
squatter settlement in the former industrial zone of Greater Buenos Aires, La
Matanza ;42 and the federation’s socio-political strength depends crucially on
the fact that the local-level organisations that have joined it are present and
embedded in barrios throughout the country, conducting all kinds of ‘ terri-
torial work’.43 Thus, it is not by chance that the piqueteros ’ prime interest has
remained the call for state-funded social assistance and employment pro-
grammes along with concrete community projects.44
The territorial inscription that characterises both movements, together
with the specific variant of politicisation described above, enables and shapes
the third common feature : the reliance on participatory, ‘horizontal ’ me-
chanisms of debate and decision-making (at least, at the grassroots level).
This organisational strategy, at the same time, responds to the difficulty of
representing highly heterogeneous constituencies ; corresponds to the crisis
and critique of representation that is directed at both the institutions of
formal democracy and the traditional representatives of the popular sectors
(trade unions and left parties) ; and increases the capacity for mobilisation
as the respective organisation is perceived as not only representing and
attending its ‘members ’, but as really being ‘our ’ organisation.
As regards the Argentine piquetero movement, the model of the open as-
sembly (asamblea) has been identified as a prime feature.45 Against the pro-
cesses of atomisation and self-incrimination that poverty and unemployment
regularly imply, the open debate among neighbours – like the collective
neighbourhood movement, that is, social organisations of different kinds, cultural organi-
sations, soup kitchens, nurseries [_]. ’ (Lito Borello, President of the FTV Buenos Aires
City ; personal communication). 39 Auyero, ‘The Moral Politics ’.
40 See Svampa and Pereyra, Entre la ruta, pp. 190–5.
41 Merklen, ‘Sobre la base ’, p. 48. 42 Svampa and Pereyra, Entre la ruta, pp. 44–9.
43 See Delamata, ‘The Organizations ’, pp. 14–7.
44 Svampa and Pereyra, Entre la ruta, p. 201. 45 Delamata, ‘The Organizations ’, p. 12.
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experiences in protest and self-help activities – helps discover the common
nature of problems and needs. As far as decision-making occurs on the
grassroots level, the organisations’ concrete objectives and strategies are
confined to locally shared interests and values ; contentious (macro-political)
issues, then, remain consensually undecided. The extent to which direct-
democratic forms of decision-making permeate the piqueteros differs heavily
and it is only the rather small ‘autonomous ’ groups that reduce representa-
tive functions to a minimum. Yet, even organisations like the Trotskyist
Polo Obrero – that are programmatically led by a ‘vanguardist ’ party – rely on
the form of the assembly when it comes to organising territorial work ‘on the
ground’. And in huge organisations like the FTV and the Corriente Clasista y
Combativa (CCC), that represent the ‘ trade unionist wing ’46 and have strong
leaders, ‘deliberative practices ’47 – institutionalised in local plenary sessions,
assemblies of the base and boards of neighbourhood leaders – still play an
important role in internal organisation. Such mechanisms of ‘horizontal ’
debate are not confined to questions of internal redistribution (for example,
of social plans), but include explicitly political and strategic topics as well.
Although its leadership is dominated by a Maoist party, the CCC thus re-
mains strategically pragmatic and programmatically diffuse – in accordance
with its largely Peronist social base.48
While in the Argentine case the ‘participatory moment ’ represents an
important deviation from traditional popular sector representation, the role
of open assemblies or cabildos in indigenous organising is often traced back to
traditional (pre-Colombian) ways of decision-making which were (in part)
consensus-oriented and based on broad and informal debates.49 As regards
this notion of an ‘ indigenous democracy ’, the direct accountability and
‘social control ’ of elected representatives, the continuous consultation of
the base as a ‘direct channel between the authority and the people ’, and the
important role of the (local) collectivity ‘ from the beginning of the selection
of candidates, during the campaign and, particularly, in the participation in
the exercise of power ’, is emphasised.50 Yet, the ‘communal forms of par-
ticipation and self-governance ’51 developed by indigenous organisations
throughout Ecuador during the last decades have to be seen as contemporary
responses to the experiences with existing representative institutions in
46 See Svampa and Pereyra, Entre la ruta, pp. 58–63. 47 Ibid., p. 183.
48 Personal communication with Juan Carlos Alderete, the national co-ordinator of the CCC
piqueteros.
49 Tanya Korovkin, Comunidades Indı́genas, Economı́a de Mercado y Democracia en los Andes
Ecuatorianos (Quito, 2002), p. 147.
50 Lourdes Tibán, ‘La Democracia como un referente en el Pensamiento Polı́tico Indı́gena ’,
in INDESIC (ed.), La Minga de la Democracia (Quito, 2002), pp. 38–40.
51 Korovkin, Comunidades Indı́genas, p. 129.
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general and clientelist mechanisms of political control in particular. A case in
point is the emergence of ‘alternative local governments ’ led by indigenous
Pachakutik mayors, which are characterised by participatory modes of mu-
nicipal governance. Another example concerns CONAIE’s (ongoing) strat-
egy to establish alternative ‘parliaments ’ to represent the indigenous and
non-indigenous popular sectors. Correspondingly, the military/indigenous
rebellion against President Mahuad in January 2000 was preceded by a bot-
tom-up process of ‘popular parliaments ’, ‘first at the local and then at the
provincial level, with sessions in twenty of the twenty-two provinces that
elaborated proposals and elected representatives for the national [alternative]
parliament in Quito ’.52 As regards the indigenous organisations, the extent
of participatory practices differs, but is generally important on the level of
local communities and ‘second tier ’ organisations (representing a group
of local units) ; the possibility for directly holding their representatives ac-
countable to the local basis is reduced with growing distance from the con-
crete territorial unit.53
This ‘growing distance ’ – that applies to both indigenous and piquetero
organisations – points to the fact that the contrast with ‘old ’ representative
forms and organisations is only part of the truth. The success of the pol-
itically strongest organisations among both movements – CONAIE and
piquetero organisations like the FTV or the CCC – stems precisely from
combining participatory mechanisms and an orientation towards local com-
munity and grassroots organisations with a reliance on (charismatic) political
leaders, patterns of personalised/populist rule and clientelist practices that
are well-known from ‘traditional ’ political parties and social organisations.54
The fourth commonality concerns ‘ repertoires of contention’55 that
centred, in both cases, on the technique of blocking highways and roads. The
piquete is literally a defining attribute of the Argentine unemployed move-
ments. But also the indigenous levantamientos in Ecuador were not merely
symbolic marches ; their political repercussions stemmed not least from their
ability to bring the country to a halt precisely by blocking important roads.
The roadblock as a central form of protest perfectly fits the characteristics of
contentious collective action described so far. In this way, the mobilisation
of marginalised masses – who, according to resource mobilisation theory, do
not normally have many ways to exercise political pressure56 – becomes a
52 Walsh, ‘The Ecuadorian Political Irruption ’, p. 175.
53 Volkmar Blum, ‘Indigene Organisationen als politische Akteure in Ekuador ’,
Lateinamerika. Analysen-Daten-Dokumentation, vol. 17, no. 45 (2000), pp. 52–3.
54 See Bretón, Cooperación al desarrollo, p. 247 ; Epstein, ‘The Piquetero Movement ’, pp. 104–7.
55 McAdam et al., Dynamics of Contention.
56 J. Craig Jenkins, The Politics of Insurgency. The Farm Worker Movement in the 1960s (New York,
1985).
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directly tangible problem for the political system without the resort to violent
resistance that can easily de-legitimise the protest. The roadblock is, thus, a
suitable strategy to informally ‘ impeach’ unpopular policies or politicians
and to secure negotiations for concrete claims. Its effectiveness depends,
however, on public resonance : only if claims and claimants are seen as
legitimate by public and, especially, published opinion is ‘ the state ’ virtually
forced to at least partially give in to the protests. Repression then only adds
to the protestors’ legitimacy as demonstrated by the public reaction to the
murder of two piqueteros in Argentina in June 2002 (see above) or the re-
pression against the indigenous levantamiento in January 2001.57
In this sense, it was crucial for both movements that their ‘negative ’
macro-political claims were directed against broadly criticised policies and
politicians while their ‘positive ’ demands (for the unemployed ‘victims’ of
neo-liberal reform and for the century-long excluded indigenous peoples)
resonated well at least with progressive urban sectors. The experience of
each movement when losing public resonance – following the coup against
Mahuad and the indigenous participation in the Gutiérrez government
in Ecuador, and with President Kirchner’s success in winning the public
(opinion) in Argentina – reinforces its importance.
The evolution of the movements : internal dynamics and macro-political interactions
The political rise of social movements organising marginalised social sectors
represents, first and most significantly, an important trend in democratising
formal democracy. Apart from the substantial differences between the two
movements, unemployed and indigenous movements generally reacted to a
situation of factual exclusion with a view to increasing the representation of
heavily underprivileged societal interests and values. In other words, they
emerged in response to unfulfilled promises of democracy. Yet, democracy is
‘above all a matter of power’,58 and the substantial empowerment of mar-
ginalised strata of society thus implies the destabilisation of social power
relations. This points to a second truth : unemployed and indigenous move-
ments, respectively, played key roles in the recent political crises that put the
political regimes in Argentina and Ecuador under serious pressure. The
history of indigenous levantamientos and, particularly, CONAIE’s leading
role in the rebellion-turned-coup against President Mahuad in January 2000
made this perfectly clear. Although the piqueteros did not play a decisive role
in the ‘social explosion ’ of December 2001, they did lead the subsequent
57 Lucero, ‘Crisis and Contention ’, pp. 68–70.
58 Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens, Capitalist
Development and Democracy (Cambridge, 1992), p. 5.
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wave of massive social protests that shook the country during the first half
of 2002. In consequence, especially among conservative political forces, a
perspective has gained in prominence in both countries that views the re-
spective movements as threats to democratic stability and governability ;
others, in the meantime, have identified these popular forces as the new
protagonists of profound social change.59 Yet what is striking about the
recent past of both movements is their rapid and remarkable weakening. In
Argentina, social protests – ubiquitous and uncontrollable during the first
months of 2002 – declined continuously throughout the year, and since
President Kirchner assumed office in May 2003, the macro-political crisis
can be regarded as overcome.60 In Ecuador, another important indigenous
uprising in early 2001 followed the events of January 2000, but since then,
the trend of declining rates of socio-political conflict is clear-cut.61 With
the election of President Lucio Gutiérrez – as the candidate supported by
CONAIE and Pachakutik – in late 2002, this episode of indigenous uprisings
can be regarded as closed.62 The movements of piqueteros and indı́genas clearly
represent new (and enduring) facets of the respective country’s social and
political life. But their capacities for promoting or enforcing political change
is, for the time being, confined to piecemeal within-regime adjustments.
They refer only to processes of incremental change that are fully compatible
with the present rules of the (political, social and economic) game and do not
openly challenge the existing relations of (political, social and economic)
power.
Without broaching the normative and/or strategic debate about the de-
sirability of such ‘piecemeal within-regime adjustments ’ or about the politi-
cal merits and failures of the respective movements, this observation poses
two closely interrelated analytical questions : How could these supposedly
powerful subjects of transformation be ‘ tamed’? And why did the threat
these movements reportedly posed to the ‘old ’ political and economic elites
not materialise? The short answer to both questions is that the political
change provoked by these movements (and the socio-political crises in
59 See Svampa and Pereyra, Entre la ruta, pp. 208–15; Walsh, ‘The Ecuadorian Political
Irruption ’, pp. 198–9; Lucero, ‘Crisis and Contention ’, pp. 70–1.
60 See Wolff, ‘Ambivalent Consequences ’.
61 See Centro Andino de Acción Popular, ‘Conflictividad socio polı́tica ’, Ecuador Debate,
several issues, http://www.dlh.lahora.com.ec/paginas/debate.
62 Even as Gutiérrez, once elected, quickly broke with his supporters among the indigenous
and non-indigenous social movements, CONAIE was not able to mount any serious
challenge to his government. In the end, it was a short-term protest movement led by
urban middle-classes and the ‘ traditional ’ political parties that toppled Gutiérrez in April
2005. See Scott H. Beck and Kenneth J. Mijeski, ‘How to Lose by Winning : The
Ecuadorian Indigenous Movement After the 2002 Elections ’, Paper presented at the
XXVI International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, 15–18 March
2006, San Juan, PR, pp. 22–4.
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general) was real enough to (re-)integrate at least important parts of the
respective contentious groups, while at the same time sufficiently limited as
to not threaten entrenched interests and values of the (for its own part
heterogeneous) ‘establishment ’ in both countries. The remainder of this
section will therefore explore the intrinsic weakness of these powerful new
political actors.
Between subjects of transformation_
Undeniably, there has been political change in both Argentina and Ecuador :
the political turbulence associated, inter alia, with the indigenous and unem-
ployed movements’ contentious action have led to (relatively) higher degrees
of representation and participation of and responsiveness to (parts of) the
popular sectors as compared to the status quo ante. Since these movements
emerged, state actors take into greater account their constituencies’ claims.
Firstly, via formal democratic procedures and informal dialogue and nego-
tiation processes, the different indigenous and piquetero organisations have
gained a generally accepted voice in the political process. In Ecuador,
Pachakutik is now one of the major political parties in Congress and governs
in several municipalities ; the indigenous confederations are established ac-
tors on the national scene; and the threat to call for a levantamiento is a
(relatively) powerful resource to make indigenous claims heard. In Argentina,
the major unemployed organisations have become accepted as a new cor-
poratist group, representing the marginalised sectors left aside by traditional
organisations ; most piqueteros have established contacts with political rep-
resentatives (or participate in state institutions) at different levels of the state ;
and the (potential) roadblock or march gives them certain power in political
negotiations.
Secondly, both movements now have some veto power on questions
concerning their vital interests : Ecuadorian governments since 2001 have
refrained from reducing subsidies on (cooking) gas, a prominent issue that
had regularly provoked indigenous protests in the past, and in the same vein,
Argentine governments since December 2001 have felt obliged to prevent
the privatised public utility companies from raising their tariffs (in response
to the devaluation of the peso).63 And thirdly, concrete demands and needs
are served (if in rather limited ways), with the organisations themselves
having some stake in the organisation and implementation of these ‘ser-
vices ’. The indigenous development projects financed by CODENPE in
63 As interviews confirmed, state representatives in Argentina and Ecuador are clearly aware
that policies hurting vital interests of the unemployed/indigenous could well provoke the
(re-)union of the respective movements and the (re-)mobilisation of their constituencies.
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Ecuador and the social plans and the support for local (self-administered)
‘productive enterprises ’ in Argentina are cases in point. Independent local
self-help initiatives conducted by both movements without governmental
support add to this effect.
These macro-political successes are undeniable for Ecuador’s indigenous
movement, whose struggle has greatly enhanced the political representation
and participation of the indigenous population in both formal and material
regards.64 This is an achievement of the indigenous movement, just as much
as it demonstrates the capacity of the country’s democratic regime, however
precarious, to integrate a new political force : The successful ‘ self-integration’
into formal polity via Pachakutik reveals the polity’s general openness.65
In the case of the Argentine piqueteros, the observation of macro-political
repercussions has to be qualified. On the one hand, much of the political
change that has taken place in Argentina after December 2001, and that may
appear to respond to claims made by the unemployed movements, was not
provoked by these movements themselves. It was particularly driven by the
collapse of the economic ‘model ’ of the 1990s and the pegging of the
Argentine peso to the dollar ; by middle classes increasingly alienated from
the political system who joined the protests in end-2001; and by the behav-
iour and internal struggle of the Peronist party.66 On the other hand, the
piqueteros’ micro-political claims were much narrower than those promoted
by the indigenous movement in Ecuador. CONAIE’s specific indigenous-
oriented demands clearly went beyond a narrow focus on concrete (material)
support to embrace far-reaching issues such as land reform and a re-definition
of the state and were, thus, ‘micro’ only in the sense that they involved claims
focused on the organisation’s own base. The concrete objectives advanced
by the piqueteros, in contrast, where largely restricted to literally micro-political
claims : material support for unemployed households and projects promoted
by the piqueteros, liberty to protest, and rejection of repressive measures by the
state. The collective identity underlying indigenous mobilisation in Ecuador
by far outweighed the identidad piquetera, and CONAIE was, correspondingly,
much stronger and more encompassing an organisation than anything the
Argentine unemployed could possibly achieve.
_ and objects of instrumentalisation
In general, however, processes of democratic ‘deepening’ in both cases
have been rather limited when measured according to the extent to which
64 See Yashar, Contesting Citizenship, p. 151.
65 See Van Cott, From Movements to Parties, pp. 99–139.
66 See Steven Levitsky and Marı́a Victoria Murillo, ‘Argentina Weathers the Storm’, Journal of
Democracy, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 152–66.
(De-)Mobilising the Marginalised 21
the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X0600201X
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Hessische Stiftung Friedens - und Konfliktforschun, on 02 Sep 2021 at 07:01:07, subject to
macro-political demands were fulfilled or, particularly, socio-economic griev-
ances were remedied.67 Very clearly, the re-stabilisation in both countries
did not involve any significant redistribution of power and wealth. Rather, it
was based, in part, on the division, co-optation and marginalisation, partial
disarticulation and demobilisation of the contentious ‘protest alliances ’
which – at the height of the crises – jointly rejected existing democracies that
had proved to be far from realising the most fundamental democratic prin-
ciples (representation, participation, equality). The common characteristics
of the indigenous and the unemployed movements – the leading and most
durable protagonists of the respective crisis periods – help us understand
how this was possible. The features enabling mobilisation and collective
action in the first place implied important internal dynamics and enabled
strategies of external manipulation that in the end inhibited the movements
from realising the macro-political role many observers expected (in hope or
fear) that they might play.
Arguably the strongest factor enabling the social movements to take such
prominent roles during the periods of crisis and protest escalation was their
rejection of unpopular politicians, governments and parties, political prac-
tices and policies. Yet, as time passed and political representatives changed
and adjusted, this ‘negative ’ stance ran into a stalemate. The opening-up
of state representatives and institutions towards piqueteros or indı́genas – the
inception of informal dialogues, the establishment of consultation mechan-
isms and the granting of political concessions – led right from the start to
conflicts and divisions among and between the different organisations. In
general, the procedures of representative democracy required moves towards
‘positive ’ propositional claims regarding joint candidates, parties and poli-
cies. Here, internal heterogeneity and fragmentation (with regard to social
base, political objectives, cultures and strategies) quickly materialised. With
increasing opportunities to get ‘ some ideas heard ’ and ‘some things done ’,
the balance between the conflicting goals of ‘global rejection’ and ‘concrete
claims ’ and the corresponding strategies had to be continuously adjusted.
Different organisations and movements – as well as different groups and
leaders within organisations – responded distinctly to this challenge.
Generally, the absence of encompassing programmatic platforms that
reach beyond basic common identity (as piqueteros or indı́genas) reinforced the
67 Within the scope of this article, I can only point to the fact that the extent of political
influence and success as perceived by the respective (indigenous/unemployed) organisations
is rather limited while socio-economic indicators (poverty, un- and underemployment)
suggest only a gradual recovery after deep economic crisis. In Argentina, socio-economic
recovery is all the same quite impressive as compared to the situation of open crisis, but
poverty, social inequality, informal employment (conditions) and unemployment remain
severe problems.
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specific ‘characteristics of collective mobilisation when survival is at stake ’ :68
Negotiation and dialogue as well as concrete governmental offers – social
plans and support for local projects and micro enterprises – could hardly be
rejected even if the risks of co-optation and instrumentalisation were well
known. As governments proved capable of attracting individual leaders as
well as entire groups and organisations while additionally adjusting rhetoric
to protestors’ demands, strategies of divide et impera were highly successful.
Divisions between different wings, organisations and factions multiplied,
while competition and rivalry intensified. Also, the gap between leadership
and base widened as leaders were increasingly drawn into political dialogues
and even offices. In the end, the specific form of politicisation that combined
a radical critique with an orientation towards the local community and con-
crete needs implied that piqueteros and indigenous movements would act
much less as proactive protagonists of change than as social forces primarily
reacting to the dynamics of macro-political change and continuity.
The need to act as a relative unitary, quasi-corporatist actor – in concrete
negotiations with state agencies as well as on the level of national politics
in general – came into increasing tension with localised and participatory
mechanisms of ‘bottom-up’ organisation. Patterns of personalised or populist
rule that had always co-existed with democratic structures in the different
organisations (see above) supported the former against the latter. Finally, it
proved difficult to repeatedly mobilise the basis for massive roadblocks or
levantamientos. Beyond the situation of open (economic) crisis, the initial
public resonance to the protests gave way to a growing demand for ‘nor-
malisation’ especially among urban middle classes and the media.
If the main line of conflict deeply dividing the Argentine unemployed
movement today is the divergence of attitudes towards the government
headed by President Kirchner, it was right after the ousting of President De
la Rúa that the question of ‘co-operation versus confrontation’ commenced
to divide the piqueteros. Rodrı́guez Sáa – Interim President for a few days in
December 2001 – and his successor Duhalde held dialogues with the un-
employed organisations and granted rhetorical and practical concessions ;
when setting up the massive social plan Jefes y Jefas, Duhalde invited the
piqueteros to participate officially in Consultative Councils designed to manage
the plan’s implementation, and some agreed. Behind the debate, when and
where to participate and when and how to confront the government, lay the
major question of whether some sort of general stabilisation or the further
destabilisation of the political order was deemed necessary in order to foster
the profound change all piqueteros called for.
68 Merklen, ‘Sobre la base ’, p. 50.
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Yet, whereas during the height of the socio-political crisis following
December 2001 these divisions among the movement could well be over-
looked, the pre-electoral process that Duhalde started by announcing in June
2002 early elections for upcoming April accelerated the dynamics of fragmen-
tation. In the end, many piquetero organisations ceased to call for abstention,
but no relevant alliance between piquetero groups supporting one joint proposal
for the elections emerged either. The succession of Kirchner implied a pro-
found ‘change in political opportunity structures ’69 which further aggravated
the fragmentation of the piquetero spectrum: ‘Kirchner’s policy consisted in
applying, simultaneously, a whole range of strategies available to integrate,
co-opt, discipline and/or isolate the universe of the piquetero movement,
discriminating between the different wings and organisations. ’70 Due to the
dynamics described above, this strategy proved highly successful.
Additionally, Kirchner restored the Peronists’ traditional capacity to ap-
peal to and integrate the popular sectors ‘ from above ’ – not least through
the party machine’s patronage networks.71 A president credibly signalling his
readiness to profoundly change the (Menemist) model of the 1990s, willing
to talk to all relevant societal forces, adopting much of the protest rhetoric
and gradually fulfilling some important demands, together with a normalis-
ation of political, economic and social life (even in the context of levels of
poverty, un- and underemployment formerly unknown in Argentina) led to
increasing criticism from within and, especially, from outside the movement
over the piqueteros’ prime instrument of political activism, the roadblock.
Thus the claims and actions of the piqueteros lost much of the broad social
support they had received in the past, while more and more unemployed
organisations concluded that a measure of co-operation with the government
was the most efficient way to assert at least some of their interests and values.
This led much of the more ‘radical ’ groups to retreat further to their par-
ticular local projects – a retreat generally supported by the government
which – via subsidies for small ‘productive enterprises ’ – supports ‘ the
communitarian-style, collective self-organisation’ in which virtually all
piqueteros engage.72
As to Ecuador, the first major internal crisis of CONAIE and Pachakutik
came in 1996 when President Bucaram created a Ministry of Ethnic Affairs,
and gave the post to an indigenous leader from the Amazonian region.
The de facto control CONAIE gained over the work of the para-state devel-
opment council, CODENPE, furthered conflict with competing indigenous
69 Svampa and Pereyra, Entre la ruta, p. 212. 70 Ibid.
71 See Steven Levitsky, Transforming Labor-Based Parties in Latin America. Argentine Peronism in
Comparative Perspective (Cambridge, 2003) ; Javier Auyero, Poor People’s Politics. Peronist Survival
Networks & the Legacy of Evita (Durham, 2000).
72 Svampa and Pereyra, Entre la ruta, p. 224.
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organisations.73 In the run-off to the 2002 elections Pachakutik had to
withdraw its pre-candidate to impede a serious rupture within CONAIE
when a former President of CONAIE decided to run for the presidency on
his own account, supported by the evangelical indigenous federation, FEINE.
These internal problems and conflicts came to a head during the presidency
of Gutiérrez, which revealed important weaknesses in the indigenous
movement’s mobilisation capacities and brought to the fore the serious
contradictions inherent in the simultaneous engagement in party and social
movement politics.74 After the situation of open economic crisis – which
had facilitated the rebellion/coup against Mahuad – only a new package of
IMF-driven austerity measures announced by Mahuad’s successor, Gustavo
Noboa, enabled the massive indigenous levantamiento in early 2001. This up-
rising was the last jointly supported by all the major indigenous confeder-
ations, and not even CONAIE alone was able to mobilise significant parts of
its base during the Gutiérrez presidency. As Gutiérrez – supported by high
oil prices and the high levels of remittances from Ecuadorians working
abroad – avoided major austerity programmes against which opponents
might mobilise, the indigenous local bases proved largely indifferent to their
leaders’ severe criticism of his ‘betrayal ’ of his former allies. Generally, as the
indigenous leadership was increasingly drawn into Ecuadorian politics, its ties
to the base of the movement were weakened and with it CONAIE’s capacity
for mobilisation.75 At the same time, non-indigenous urban sectors viewed
the indigenous movement increasingly as an additional veto player promot-
ing its particularistic interests and only adding to the multiple blockades
characterising Ecuadorian politics ; indigenous claims and protests thus lost
much of their public resonance.76
Gutiérrez skilfully took advantage of these weaknesses, responding in a
familiar populist-clientelist manner to the concrete needs of the indigenous
population to calm communities and, at the same time, deepen internal
division and conflict. He brought ‘picos y palas ’ (‘picks and shovels ’) to in-
digenous municipalities, promised new roads for the much-neglected
Amazonian region, increased the political influence of those indigenous
leaders and federations (within and outside CONAIE) that refrained
from openly opposing his government, and rewarded local communities
73 At the same time, the projects financed by CODENPE reinforced the indigenous organ-
isations’ orientation towards local development while indigenous participation in this
para-state agency promoted clientelist relations with the state and within the indigenous
organisations themselves – both, arguably, at the expense of the indigenous movement’s
macro-political ambitions. See Bretón, Cooperación al desarrollo, pp. 233–35.
74 See Beck and Mijeski, ‘How to Lose by Winning ’. 75 Ibid.
76 Roberto Santana, ‘Cuando las elites dirigentes giran en redondo: El caso de los liderazgos
indı́genas en Ecuador ’, Ecuador Debate, no. 61 (2004).
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responding to his indigenous supporters. Thus, because the indigenous
movement’s effective veto power successfully convinced the government
(and donors like the World Bank) to hold back on its structural adjustment
agenda, the indigenous organisations were deprived of their prime mechan-
ism of broad political mobilisation. Given the absence of policies directly
detrimental to its social bases, ‘negative ’ politics – against the ‘ traitor ’
Gutiérrez – proved largely ineffective, leaving the pragmatist ‘positive ’
agenda (‘ satisfying basic needs ’) to be exploited in order to divide and
weaken the indigenous movement as a political actor.
Recent events in Ecuador reinforce this analysis. On the one hand, the
‘negative ’ rejection of a bilateral trade agreement with the United
States – with potentially severe consequences for small agriculture – has
recently provoked broad social protests led by the indigenous movement.
On the other, in the run-up to the presidential elections in October 2006 the
indigenous movement again revealed its deep divisions and its contemporary
incapacity to lead – or, collectively participate in – a broad progressive
alliance. Although CONAIE and Pachakutik had generally agreed on the
candidacy of CONAIE President Luis Macas and thus aimed at continued (if
exclusively indigenous) macro-political participation, the ‘growing indigenismo
of Pachakutik’s actions ’77 pointed to the retreat to an indigenously defined
(micro-) political project. Consequently, Luis Macas stressed that in order to
overcome its internal crisis CONAIE had to ‘ return to the central themes
that brought together the indigenous movement, which are territory and
education ’.78
In sum, this analysis of the intrinsic weakness of both movements reveals
a remarkable capacity for (re-)stabilisation and pacification on the part of the
democratic regimes in question. Tarrow has argued in relation to social
movements in the ‘old ’ and stable democracies of Western Europe and
Northern America that ‘ the structure of politics through which claims are
processed in democratic states forces them into a common crucible from
which cycles of reform are the most likely outcome’.79 In the cases analysed
here, ‘ reform’ in the sense of an opening-up of the political system and
political responses to the movements’ claims is certainly an important aspect.
However, the capacity of the respective states to process contentious claims
did not only involve such formal-democratic procedures. Informal mechan-
isms of political response, integration and co-optation via ad hoc dialogues,
quasi-corporatist negotiations, and clientelist and populist practices proved
important as well in enabling political leaders and parties to (partially)
77 Beck and Mijeski, ‘How to Lose by Winning ’, p. 17.
78 Luis Macas, ‘Unifying the Indigenous Movement in Ecuador ’, Interview (25 July 2005)
published in http://www.oxfamamerica.org. 79 Tarrow, Power in movement, p. 161.
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respond to the movements’ claims while, at the same time, working to de-
mobilise them. Yet again, the intrinsic characteristics of the social move-
ments identified above proved crucial for the success of these political
conflict regulation strategies. The specific features that enabled the mobilis-
ation of the marginalised also facilitated strategies of external ‘manipulation’
(clientelism, divide et impera) that undermined their potential as macro-political
change actors.
Additionally, as specific political opportunities have been identified as
important for the initial mobilisation of indı́genas and piqueteros, changes in
these political opportunity structures heavily affected the movements. Much
as the enactment of neo-liberally guided reforms and the acceleration of
economic crises provided the movements with an increasingly resonant
public (opinion), the suspension (or even partial withdrawal) of such reforms
together with economic re-stabilisation deprived the movements of this
crucial external resource.
Conclusion
The indigenous movement in Ecuador and the piquetero organisations in
Argentina have succeeded in mobilising marginalised sectors of society. The
capacity on the part of these new movements to exert political pressure by
mobilising masses and blocking highways has contributed – via an open
challenge to the political system that also included other social (protest)
actors – to important adjustments of the democratic regimes in question. Up
to now, however, these processes of change have been piecemeal only. The
formal-democratic order has not broken down, nor is there a profound
process of ‘democratic deepening ’ to be detected. Yet, clearly reaching be-
yond mere continuity, the indigenous peoples in Ecuador have gained a
political voice through established social and political organisations, through
the institutions of formal democracy as well as through more or less in-
stitutionalised channels of negotiation and dialogue. In the case of the
Argentine piqueteros, informal ways of exerting influence dominate, and for-
mal-democratic instances remain largely confined to piquetero leaders’ par-
ticipation as individuals in parliament or governmental offices. This is due,
on the one hand, to the capacity of the Peronist party to adapt to changing
circumstances and to absorb contentious social forces and, on the other, to
the fact that the social category of ‘unemployed workers ’ does not represent
a viable social cleavage on which to build distinct political organisations. Still,
there can be no doubt that the democratic regimes in both countries are now
more open to these popular sector organisations.
Clearly, although the institutions of polyarchy formally enable numerically
strong groups to use numbers (votes) as a political resource to compensate
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for disparities in economic and social power, the realisation of this potential
depends on the capacity to organise effectively and articulate collectively the
respective interests and values. The ‘power of organized numbers ’,80 thus,
presupposes the power to organise numbers. Apparently, the extent of pol-
itical participation, representation and responsiveness that existing democ-
racies ‘grant ’ to social sectors and groups which do not dispose of power
resources that ensure ‘automatic ’ political attention co-varies with their re-
spective capacity for autonomous organisation and mobilisation, or, more
precisely, with their ‘potential for disturbance ’. As seen, the specific
characteristics of both social movements help explain why this ‘potential ’
has remained rather limited, and why, consequently, the respective political
regimes could respond to their claims and actions without excessively en-
dangering the vital interests of those with disproportionate institutional,
economic and political power. The democratic systems in Argentina and
Ecuador have thus been able to adapt to the challenge posed by newly
emerging contentious collective actors even while confronted with severe
economic crises.
Such successful ‘ taming ’ of contentious movements without surrendering
to their claims is certainly not a new phenomenon. Nor is the existence of
locally- and subsistence-oriented social movements whose macro-political
power is basically ‘negative ’ – prohibitive and ‘de-stituent ’. What is new,
however, is that such movements of marginalised people are the prime for-
ces of contentious collective action in democratic politics. This directly fol-
lows the weakening of ‘ traditional ’ social and political organisations which
represent the popular sectors that is associated with the double transform-
ation in the region.81 Because both the indigenous movement in Ecuador
and the Argentine piqueteros are, for the time being, the most important social
forces representing the (marginalised) popular sectors, their intrinsic weak-
ness helps explain the ‘ surprising vitality ’ of Latin American democracy ‘ in
the face of overwhelming economic constraints ’ that Karen Remmer already
noted in 1990.82 When recalling South America’s history of authoritarian
rule, this democratic ‘vitality ’ in spite of intolerable social conditions is cer-
tainly positive. But the question remains as to how processes of profound
social change can be achieved by non-violent democratic means that lead a
way out of the ‘Latin American triangle ’ of procedural democracy, poverty
and inequality.83
80 Jenkins, The Politics of Insurgency, p. xi. 81 See the sources in note 26.
82 Karen L. Remmer, ‘Democracy and Economic Crisis : The Latin American Experience ’,
World Politics, vol. 42, no. 3 (1990), p. 335.
83 UNDP, La Democracia an América Latina. Hacia una democracia de ciudadanas y ciudadanos
(New York, 2004), p. 39.
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This article has set out to shed some further light on the question of why
this triangle is much more stable a configuration than the principles and
ideals of democracy would suggest. As seen, the social forces most hurt by
poverty and inequality and, thus, most prone to challenge a procedural
democracy that serves to reproduce such a social structure, have limited
capacities to do so – and this, in turn, is not least a consequence of the social
structure itself. Benefiting from the intrinsic weakness of the social move-
ments, the democracies in the countries analysed reveal a remarkable
capacity to adjust to contentious challengers ‘ from below’. On the one hand,
formal-democratic mechanisms of participation, representation and respon-
siveness lead to the (partial) inclusion of newly mobilised collective actors ;
on the other, entrenched informal practices of political conduct – direct
quasi-corporatist negotiations, clientelist and populist responses – can be
applied by political leaders as informal mechanisms of conflict regulation to
serve some demands of the challengers and, at the same time, to undermine
the basis for contentious mobilisation. Taking up this line of argument,
further research could focus more explicitly on these patterns of political
conflict regulation as applied by the (democratic) state while extending the
analysis beyond the two cases to include such cases as the apparently much
more successful social movement(s) in Bolivia.
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